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2

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

ECHO MARNE KURR,
Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20110879-CA

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
Appeal from a conviction for one count of Retail Theft, a Third Degree Felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 in the Second District Court, State of Utah,
the Honorable Noel S. Hyde, Judge, presiding.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-102(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether defense counsel ineffectively failed to request the Long instruction or to

provide expert testimony on false identifications when the only issue in the case involved
the potential for mistaken identification.

a.

Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for
the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Perry, 2009 U T
App51,J9,204P.3d880.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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b.

Preservation of the Argument. Defense counsel did not raise any of these
issues, so this matter must be reviewed under ineffective assistance of
counsel.

C O N S T I T U T I O N A L OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This appeal is governed by U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI and XIV, Utah Const. Art.
I §§7,12.

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
O n December 23,2010, the State filed an information charging the defendant
with Retail Theft, a Third Degree Felony. R. 1. O n May 11, 2011, the case was tried to a
jury, but the court declared a mistrial. R 62:12. The case was again tried to a jury on
August 4,2011 resulting in a guilty verdict. R. 43,63. The judgment was entered on
September 23,2011. R. 50. O n October 3, 2011, the defendant filed a notice of appeal to
this Court. R 53.

STATEMENT OF T H E FACTS
1. Testimony of Chad Wise
Chad Wise was a loss prevention officer for Sears at the Newgate Mall in Ogden.
R. 63:14. O n November 9,2010, he was working the security cameras when he saw a
suspicious person. R 63:16. Chad asked another loss prevention officer, Victor Garcia,
2
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to watch this person on the floor, while he, Chad, continued to observe the person with
the cameras. R. 63:17. Chad preserved six clips from his surveillance which were shown
to the jury, including clips in which the individual selected a boy's hoodie and walked
around the store toward the exit. R. 63:19-29, 32. Chad testified that he was able to
observe on the camera this individual leaving the store without paying for her items. R.
63:30.
Chad ran down the sidewalk and to the parking lot with the other officer to
apprehend this person. R. 63:30. She was in her car with the door still open and he was
about 15 yards from her. R. 63:31. He had a "pretty clear, unobstructed" view of the
person. R. 63:31. Chad testified that the person in the car and the person on the
videotape were the defendant, Echo Kurr. R. 63:32. The white car, which he believed to
be a Nissan, drove away quickly, and his partner Victor was able to obtain a license plate
number. R. 63:33.
Chad contacted the Ogden police department and he gave a description of the
person as well as a video to Detective Allred. R 63:36-37. Chad did not film events on
the outside of the store, even though there were cameras, since he had left the
surveillance room. R. 63:38. At no point did defense counsel question Mr. Wise about
the accuracy of his identification.

3
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2. Testimony of Victor Garcia
Victor Garcia was also a loss prevention officer at Sears. R. 63:45. H e testified that
he watched the surveillance footage twice before he came to trial. R. 63:52. Victor was in
the surveillance room monitoring cameras, and when they spotted the suspicious person,
Victor left to watch her on the floor, taking his two-way radio. R. 63:51-53. Although he
was unable to make contact with this person on the floor, he received a radio
communication that she was exiting the building. R. 63:53-55. He arrived in time to
witness this person leave with a male. R 63:55.
Outside, right in front of the store's doors, Victor asked her to stop, identifying
himself as with Sears' loss prevention department. R. 63:55-56, 57. He was at least an
arm's length away from the woman, whom he identified as Echo Kurr. R. 63:56-57. Ms.
Kurr had a blue hoodie on her arm. R. 63:57. Ms. Kurr told him that she did not have
unpaid items, and the man with her told her to leave. R. 63:58. Victor told them that she
needed to come back since she did not pay for items, and the man said that a [s]he doesn't
have anything" and the two proceeded to the parking lot. R. 63:58.
As the two walked toward their vehicle, a white Nissan with an odd striped
pattern, Victor informed them that he had them on camera, and that it was better for
them to cooperate. R. 63:59-60. They got into the car and Victor asked them to at least

4
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return the property. R. 63:60. Ms. Kurr turned, threw the shirt at him and the two left.
R 63:60. Victor read the license plate as they drove away. R 63:60.

3. Testimony of Collette Allred
Collette Allred was a police officer with the Ogden City police department. R
63:63. The officer received the video from Sears. R 63:64. She also ran the vehicle's
license plate, which came up as a white Nissan Altima registered to Echo Kurr. R. 63:6465. After reviewing the tape, the officer compared a photo of Ms. Kurr against the
perpetrator and believed them to be the same person. R 63:66.
Ms. Allred prepared a six photo lineup "how we always do ... where we found
people of likeness to this person." R 63:66. She showed the lineup to Chad Wise who
"immediately" picked Ms. Kurr as the person he saw. R. 63:66. She did not show a lineup
to Victor Garcia. R 63:67.

4. Defendant's Statements at Sentencing
At sentencing, Ms. Kurr told the court that "Mr. Gravis has not been conducive
to my well being from the get — he said just outside just a minute ago that my credibility
was shot with him right out of the gate ...." R 64:4. Mr. Gravis said that he did not tell
Ms. Kurr that her credibility "was shot with me. I said your credibility was shot—" R
64:4. Ms. Kurr responded that she begged counsel to fight for her, and that she did not
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believe "that I was defended properly at all." R. 64:5. She said that Mr. Gravis told her
that her defense "wouldn't work" and that "it was his choices to make what he was going
to do at trial." R. 64:5. She told the court that she planned to appeal "because I feel that
I've been unfairly — I haven't even been represented." R. 64:5.
Neither the court, nor defense counsel specifically responded or queried Ms. Kurr
about these allegations. The only response came from the prosecutor, who pointed out
that Ms. Kurr failed to accept responsibility and wanted to blame her attorney. R. 64:7.

SUMMARY OF T H E A R G U M E N T
Defense counsel ineffectively failed to attack the eyewitness identifications made
in this case. H e did not present the Long instruction, nor did he present expert
testimony as to the flaws of eyewitness identifications. In fact, the record supports the
assertion that defense counsel believed the defendant's credibility "was shot," and did
little to actually defend her. These failures to even challenge the State's evidence
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and denied Ms. Kurr due process of law.

ARGUMENT
At no point did defense counsel present any evidence, let alone challenge the
identification, or argue to the jury that the witnesses may have misidentified Ms. Kurr.
In fact, he admitted to the jury that Ms. Kurr was present. R. 63:82. However,

6
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substantial evidence existed justifying arguing that Ms. Kurr was not the person who was
present when the offense was committed and defense counsel ineffectively failed to
challenge the identification.

I.

DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVELY FAILED TO
CHALLENGE THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS OR
REQUEST A LONG INSTRUCTION,

"Mistaken eyewitness identification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions
in the United States, accounting for 88% of wrongful rape convictions and 50% of
wrongful murder convictions between 1989 and 2003." Timothy P. O'Toole &
Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Braithwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decisionfor
Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 109,
110 (2006); see John C. Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman & Christian A. Meissner,
Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36
Court Review 12,12 (1999) ("not only is eyewitness evidence powerful, it is also more
likely to be erroneous than any other type of evidence"). The Utah Supreme Court has
also recognized serious flaws with eyewitness identification:
Although research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in
eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems.
People simply do not accurately understand the deleterious effects that certain
variables can have on the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest
eyewitness.
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483,490 (Utah 1986) holding modified by State v. Clopten, 2009
U T 84, 223 P.3d 1103. Given serious problems, coupled with the fact that jurors tend to
overvalue eyewitness identifications, the Court opted to craft its own solution:
[I]n cases tried from this date forward, trial courts shall give such an instruction
whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an
instruction is requested by the defense. Given the great weight jurors are likely to
give eyewitness testimony, and the deep and generally unperceived flaws in it, to
convict a defendant on such evidence without advising the jury of the factors that
should be considered in evaluating it could well deny the defendant due process of
law under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Id. at 492. This jury instruction became known as the Long instruction. In a later case,
the Court required trial courts to conduct "an in-depth appraisal of the identification's
reliability along the lines laid out by Long." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,780 (Utah
1991) holding modified by State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). This "indepth" Ramirez hearing required trial courts to conduct a five-part analysis of the
eyewitness identification to determine whether the witness testimony should be
admissible. Id. at 780-81.
In 2009, the Supreme Court recognized that Long had actually discouraged courts
from allowing the introduction of expert testimony in identification cases. Clop ten, 2009
U T 84 at f f 8-14. Consequently, after an extremely thorough review of the literature,
the Court opted to
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hold that, in cases where eyewitnesses are identifying a stranger and one or more
established factors affecting accuracy are present, the testimony of a qualified
expert is both reliable and helpful, as required by rule 702. Such eyewitness expert
testimony should therefore be routinely admitted, regardless of whether the trial
judge decides to issue a cautionary instruction.

///.at J 49.
Defense counsel did not present a Long instruction nor did he challenge the
identification of the defendant through the use of expert testimony, a Ramirez hearing,
or even cross-examination. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must show that his counsel's "performance both falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness and prejudices his client." Adams v. State, 2005 U T 62, f 25,
123 P.3d 400 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687,104 S. Ct. 2052,80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal
presents a question of law. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant
must show: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) a
reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would
have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. T o satisfy the first part of the
test, defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel
rendered adequate assistance.
State v. Ott, 2010 U T 1, f 22, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (internal quotations and citation
omitted).

9
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1. Counsel's Performance was Objectively Deficient
Two years prior to Ms. Kurr's trial, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v.
Clopten. Defense counsel never formally filed a motion for a Ramirez or Clopten hearing.
H e never moved to present expert testimony on the pitfalls of eyewitness identification.
H e never introduced the Long instruction. He failed to take these steps, despite the
Supreme Court's opinion that cross-examination of witnesses and cautionary
instructions "suffer from serious shortcomings when it comes to addressing the merits of
eyewitness identifications" and that expert testimony "has been shown to be the best
method for educating the jury about factors that can contribute to mistaken eyewitness
identifications." Clopten, 2009 U T 84 ^ f 16-17 (including header in between the
paragraphs).
The literature is replete with the conclusion that juries do not understand the
phenomenon of misidentifications and that cautionary instructions or crossexamination are woefully inadequate to convey to the jury the fundamental flaws in
eyewitness testimony. See Clopten, 2009 U T 84, ^ f 15-38. There can be no conceivable
benefit to the defendant for failing to present expert testimony or to challenge the
identifications. "[I]f the evidence ha[s] no conceivable beneficial value to [the
defendant], the failure to object to it cannot be excused as trial strategy." State v. Ott,
2010 U T 1,5 38,247 P.3d 344,354, reh'gdenied (June 11,2010), cert, denied, 131 S.
10
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Ct. 1472,179 L. Ed. 2d 360 (U.S. 2011) (quoting State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37,42
(Utah 1996)). As the Supreme Court articulated, anything other than expert testimony
would not adequately convey the problems to the jury. Ms. Kurr's case hinged entirely on
witness's identifications and there can be no conceivable trial strategy in choosing to
totally disregard any challenge to them.
In State v. Maestas, 1999 U T 32,984 P.2d 376, the Utah Supreme Court held
that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction or to
challenge the eyewitness identifications. Witnesses identified Maestas as a robbery
suspect while he was surrounded by police officers. Id. at f 23. Maestas's "only defense ...
was the unreliability of the eyewitness identifications." Id. at f 25. The Court
summarized Long and defense counsel's obligations given that decision:
Our decision in Long leads to the conclusion that, unless obvious tactical reasons
exist to forego an instruction, trial counsel faced with seven eyewitnesses who,
with varying degrees of certainty and consistency, all identify his client as the
perpetrator, should request a cautionary eyewitness instruction.
Id. at ^ 28. In Maestas's case, the witnesses had a limited opportunity to see the
perpetrator, whose face was covered; for some of the witnesses, the identification was
cross-racial; some focused on the weapon; and all of the witnesses' "identifications were
tainted by a highly suggestive show-up." Id. at 5 29.

11
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Defense counsel in Maestas, like counsel in this case, did nothing to attack the
identifications:
Trial counsel did nothing to focus the jury's attention on the limitations of
eyewitness identification. He did not educate the jury with respect to the factors
set forth in Long, which affect eyewitness identification, nor did he argue how
each of those factors could have affected particular eyewitnesses. Counsel did not
present expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification.
In sum, the record is devoid of evidence or argument that would adequately
inform the jury regarding the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications.
Id. at f 30. Given these deficiencies, the Court held that "trial counsel rendered
objectively deficient performance by failing to request a cautionary eyewitness
identification instruction that would have informed the jury of the unreliability of
eyewitness identifications." Id. at f 31.
Ms. Kurr has a right under due process to present evidence in support of her
theory of the case. See State v. Stephens, 661 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("The right of a defendant to produce evidence in his own behalf is one of
the most fundamental aspects of a fair trial"); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95,93 S.Ct. 351,
353, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (same); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,19, 87 S. Ct.
1920,1923,18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967) ("The right to offer the testimony of witnesses,
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the
prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the

12
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right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their
testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right
is a fundamental element of due process of law.").
In the case at hand, however, at no point during the trial did defense counsel
present a Long instruction or challenge the eyewitness identifications. Essentially, these
failures deprived the defendant of the right to present her defense and violated due
process. The accuracy of the eyewitness identifications was the only issue in the case. If
the security officers accurately viewed Ms. Kurr commit the offense, then she could
legitimately be convicted. However, if their identifications were in anyway inaccurate or
tainted, then a substantial possibility exists that Ms. Kurr did not commit the offense in
question. Defense counsel had a duty to present at a minimum the Long instruction, and
even better, expert testimony to educate the jury about the phenomenon of false
identifications. His failure to do so deprived the defendant, not only key material, but of
the essence of her defense.

2. The Deficient Performance Prejudiced the Defense
Identification was the primary issue in the case. The State's entire case hinged on
the testimony of two witnesses. Yet, "[t]he most troubling dilemma regarding
eyewitnesses stems from the possibility that an inaccurate identification may be just as
convincing to a jury as an accurate one." Clopten, 2009 U T 84 at f 17.
13
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Clearly, given the fact that the jury heard none of this evidence, they were left
with a false impression that the eyewitness identifications were stronger than they
actually were. Defense counsel's failure to call an expert, or present the Long instruction,
prejudiced the defendant and made it significantly more likely that the jury convicted
her of this offense.
Expert testimony is "the best method" for educating juries about the problems in
eyewitness cases. Clopten, 2009 U T 84 at f f 16-17; see also State v. Hales, 2007 U T 14,
152 P.3d 321 (defendant was prejudiced by ineffective counsel's failure to secure an
expert to analyze C T scans in a shaken baby case). Additionally, cross-examination is
one of the least-effective methods of discrediting eyewitness testimony. Id. at J 16,2122. Juries, the court said, are completely unaware of the problems in eyewitness
identification. Id. at f 15. The Supreme Court emphasized that "expert testimony has
been shown to substantially enhance the ability of juries to recognize potential problems
with eyewitness testimony." Id. at J 25. In fact, in stranger identification cases, trial
courts should "routinely admit expert testimony." Id. at f 33; see also id at f 49
("eyewitness expert testimony should therefore be routinely admitted...."). The Court
emphasized that if the case involves one of stranger identification and "one or more" of

x

some twenty-seven factors were present, then expert testimony, as a matter of law, will
assist the trier of fact as required by Rule 702. Id. at f 32.
14
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I

In this case, at least one of the factors occurred. 1 T h e identification of the theft
occurred after a relatively short view on a security camera, rather than in person. R.
63:16-32. The identifications were later made from a photo lineup, rather than in
person, with only one of the witnesses. R. 63:61,66-67. The photo lineup may well have
been tainted. The officer said only that, "we found people of likeness to this person." R,
63:66. If all of the people in the lineup looked like the defendant, rather than from the
witnesses' descriptions, there is a substantial likelihood that the photo lineup was
tainted. See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1112 (Utah 1994) ("The key is whether the
descriptions of the subjects in the photo array match the description of the suspect."); 92
Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 379 (Originally published in 2006) ("For a fair line-up, the
fillers should generally match the description of the suspect given by the witness.") There
also exists the potential, though defense counsel did not develop this on the record, that
the identifications were cross-racial. The Supreme Court expressed a very real fear that
potentially occurs in this case: "[i]f unreliable identifications are not addressed properly at
trial, then there exists an unacceptable risk of the innocent being punished and

1

The identification was cross-racial; the victim was under stress or fright; there were
distractions; a weapon was present (weapon focus); attention given by the witness;
length of time between the event and identification; inconsistent descriptions; the value
of lineups compared to showups, the value of photo identifications compared to inperson identification; potentially suggestive conduct, such as the instructions given to
the eyewitness by police, the composition of the lineup, the way in which the lineup was
carried out, and the behaviors of the person conducting the lineup. Id. at J 32, n. 22.
15
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dangerous criminals remaining at large." Id. at f 49 (emphasis added). Since at least one
of the factors is present, the Supreme Court has held that expert testimony should have
been admissible, which did not happen in this case.
Additionally, as the Supreme Court articulated in Maestas, even though an
"abundance" of evidence linked Maestas to the crime, defense counsel's failure to present
a "cautionary instruction seriously undermined the fairness of this trial." Maestas, 1999
U T 32 at f J 33-34. The Long instruction, the Court held, "went to the heart of the
defense-the theory that Maestas was mistakenly identified." Id. at f 34. Consequently,
"trial counsel's failure to request a cautionary eyewitness instruction rendered his
performance constitutionally deficient and prejudiced Maestas."
Similarly, the heart of Ms. Kurr's case very well could have been a mistaken
identification, but counsel failed to present any evidence toward this potential defense.
At sentencing, Ms. Kurr refused to accept responsibility, as noted by the prosecutor. R.
64:7. In fact, she alleged that defense counsel told her that "what really happened" would
not work as a defense. R. 64:5. Perhaps even more disturbing, and extremely illustrative
of ineffective assistance, is counsel's statement to the court at sentencing that he told Ms.
Kurr that her credibility was shot. R. 64:4. If Ms. Kurr's counsel did not believe her, then
he failed to truly function as an advocate. "[A]n attorney who adopts and acts upon a
belief that his client should be convicted fail[s] to function in any meaningful sense as
16
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the Government's adversary." Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612,625 (10th Cir. 1988)
(quoting in part United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,666, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657,104 S. Ct.
2039 (1984))). An "attorney who is burdened by a conflict between his client's interests
and his own sympathies to the prosecution's position is considerably worse than an
attorney with loyalty to other defendants, because the interests of the state and the
defendant are necessarily in opposition." Osborn, 861 F.2d at 629. In fact, it appears from
the record that defense counsel and the defendant were laboring under difficulties which
might have affected her ability to have a fair defense.
"An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney... who plays the role
necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685,104 S. Ct. at 2063.
See also Kryger v. Turner•, 479 P.2d 477,480 (Utah 1971) ("The right of an accused to
have counsel is not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the record by an
attorney who manifests no real concern about the interests of the accused."); see also
Alires v. Turner, 449 P.2d 241,243 (Utah 1969). "The accused is entitled to the
assistance of a competent member of the Bar, who demonstrates a willingness to identify
himself with the interests of the defendant and who will assert such defenses as are
available to him under the law and consistent with the ethics of the profession. Kryger,
479 P.2d at 480. "The failure of such representation constitutes a departure from due
process of law." Id.
17

'

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Because a violation of the right to counsel is so entwined with the right to a fair
trial, it cannot be harmless error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23 n.8,17 L. Ed.
2d 705,87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,9 L. Ed. 2d
799,83 S.Ct. 792 (1963)).
Defense counsel engaged in only minimal questioning. Of the State's three
witnesses, defense counsel questioned them for a combined total of seven pages. R.
63:38-40,61-62,67-68. His questions barely challenged the State's witnesses as to any
aspect of their testimony. The State, on the other hand, questioned witnesses for fortyfour pages. R. 63:14-38,45-61, 63-67. These combined failures, accompanied with
defense counsel's statement that Ms. Kurr's credibility was shot, support a finding that
defense counsel did not function as a true advocate, which is a firm requirement of due
process.
The State might argue that both witnesses confidently identified the defendant in
court. Chad Wise testified that he had a clear, unobstructed view of Ms. Kurr from 15
yards away. R. 63:31-32. Victor Garcia testified that he was "at arm's length" from the
defendant. R. 63:56-57. Detective Ailred testified that after her review of the video, Ms.
Kurr appeared to be the same person who was in the store. R. 63:66. However, as the
Court in Clopten articulated, "juries seemed to be swayed the most by the confidence of
an eyewitness, even though such confidence correlates only weakly with accuracy."
18
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Clopten, 2009 U T 84 at f 15. In fact, there was a very real danger that the jury in this
case was over persuaded by the witnesses' confident assertions to believing that Ms. Kurr
was the person depicted in the videotape. Expert testimony and the Long instruction are
precisely the solutions the Utah Supreme Court has promulgated to remedy this
problem, and counsel's failure to use them critically deprived the defendant of the most
persuasive evidence of her innocence.
Perhaps the most critical piece of evidence is the store surveillance footage. Of
course the jury itself could compare the face in the surveillance footage to the defendant.
However, the record does not reflect that it actually was the defendant's face in the
footage. At one point, the record shows that the camera focused on the person's face. R.
63:25, 26. But the person is never actually referred to as the defendant. She is called "an
individual," R 63:24, and "the individual," R. 63:25,26, 27, leading one to conclude that
her identity was not certain. Only once is the perpetrator referred to as Ms. Kurr in
reference to the videotape and that was in the prosecutor's question, not in the answer.
R. 63:28.
The prosecutor took great pains to establish through the testimony of both
witnesses that the person depicted and Ms. Kurr were one and the same. R. 63:32,56-57,
66. He would not have had to make these arguments had the tape clearly depicted the
defendant. In other words, the witness testimony appears to have been used to clarify or
19
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elucidate information which wasn't clear from the tape, namely the identity of the
perpetrator.
Thus, the record does not establish that Ms. Kurr was actually the person
depicted in the surveillance. Any argument that somehow the jury relied on the
surveillance footage to make the identification presupposes that they did not rely on the
solely on the security officers' representation of the defendant's identity—which appears
to have been the key factors in the State's case. The eyewitness identifications, however,
suffered from clear problems which may well have undercut the jury's reliance on their
representations of what occurred in the footage.
Counsel presented no defense contending that Ms. Kurr was not the person who
committed the offense or that security personnel mistakenly identified her. Ms. Kurr
had no other defense available to her. His failure in such circumstances to challenge the
identifications or to present the Long instruction is constitutionally defective and
entitles Ms. Kurr to a new trial with effective counsel. Because the identifications were
the heart of the State's case against Ms. Kurr, and because counsel did nothing to
challenge them, one cannot say with any confidence that the verdict would not have
been affected had the identifications been adequately challenged. Ms. Kurr has met her
burden to show prejudice in this matter.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Ms. Kurr asks this Court to find that her counsel
ineffectively failed to challenge the eyewitness identifications in this case, and that had he
done so, Ms. Kurr would have received a not-guilty verdict. She asks this Court to
remand for a new trial.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^

day of April, 2012.

P-^&r
SAMUEL P. NEWTON
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Constitutional Provisions
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U N I T E D STATES C O N S T I T U T I O N
Fifth Amendment
N o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.
Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the assistance of counsel for his defen(s)e.
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. N o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article 1, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article 1, Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
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-1IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
Case No. 101902904 FS

vs
ECHO MARNE KURR,

)

Defendant.

)

Sentencing
Electronically Recorded on
September 13, 2011

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE NOEL S. HYDE
Second District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

Christopher L. Shaw
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY
2380 Washington Blvd. #230
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801)399-8377

For the Defendant:

Martin V. Gravis
2568 Washington Blvd. #205
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801)392-8231

Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT

152 Katresha St.
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-2P R O C E E D I N G S
(Electronically recorded on September 13, 2011)
MR. GRAVIS:

The last matter I have is No. 51, Echo

Kurr.
THE COURT:

This is in the matter of State of Utah

vs. Echo Marne Kurr, case No. 101902904.
sentencing.

This is time set for

Is there any legal reason why we cannot proceed with

sentencing in this case today?
MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:
input you have.
report.

No, your Honor.
All right.

Let me hear then, Counsel, any

I have reviewed the pre-sentence investigation

I'll also hear any input from the State,
MR. GRAVIS:

Yes, your Honor.

fact, she came to trial twice.

You heard the trial.

In

Actually, it was lucky for the

State because they got a witness that they didn't have the first
time that may have made quite a difference in the case that was
available for the second time we came to trial.

We'd ask the

Court to reduce the jail time down to 120 days, otherwise follow
the recommendation.
THE COURT:
MR. SHAW:

All right.
Yes.

Input from the State?

If we're going to impose jail and

terminate, then she should be sent to prison and let the board of
pardons deal with this matter.

Clearly her record is horrendous.

It's property crime after property crime, forgery, false info.
mean it's ugly from March of "96 through the present.
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I

-3So my view is if the recommendation out of the
Farmington Office of Adult Parole and Parole is jail and
termination, then she ought to go to prison and let the board of
pardons determine how best to handle her.

Otherwise -- certainly

it won't hurt her record to go out to prison, but if this Court's
going to put her in jail in lieu of prison, then she is the type
of individual that needs to be on probation and it should be a
zero tolerant probation.

This record is absolutely replete with

similar offenses and recurrent behavior.
THE COURT:

All right.

That's my view.

Does defendant wish to make any

statement before sentence is imposed?
MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

Your Honor, in response to that -Sure.

MR. GRAVIS:

-- I (inaudible) probation determined that

they did not feel that prison was appropriate in this case, and
that supervision, they -- because of her -- I can't remember
where it said exactly in here, but it did -- they did indicate,
"After reviewing the present case, Adult Probation and Parole
staffing committee feels the present offense does not warrant a
prison recommendation."

They feel that she wouldn't be -- do

well on probation either, and they just want -- think a jail
sentence and termination is the most appropriate sentence.
That's their position.
MR. SHAW:

Well, in my view then what happens is one is

punished and has no accountability for a conviction of a felony
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-4offense given her record.

I mean that sends the wrong message

not only to Ms. Kurr, but: to each and every person in similar
shoes.

This is the kind of behavior that's gone on for what,

15 years.

So she violates or she gets out and does it again

and there's no consequences.

What will hopefully keep her from

recurring behavior is facing consequences on probation if this
Court chooses to do that.
THE COURT;

All right.

Ms. Kurr, anything you wish to

say before the Court imposes sentence?
(Ms. Kurr stands away from microphone and is inaudible)
MS. KURR:

I've had a lot (inaudible) consequences.

I

have (inaudible), but I (inaudible) prosecution is (inaudible) I
don't want to go to prison.
I feel like I haven't been -- Mr. Gravis has not been
conducive to my well being from the get -- he said just outside
just a minute ago that my credibility was shot with him right out
of the gate, and I don't know why he didn't stop -MR. GRAVIS:
MS. KURR:
MR. GRAVIS:

I didn't say

—

-- defending me if --- it was shot with me.

I said your

credibility was shot -MS. KURR:
fight for me.

No, he said -- he did not —

Please fight for me."

I said, "Please

I want (inaudible) out of

this whole entire time, fight for me one time.

He says, "Well,

because you -- of your credibility, you and your husband's
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-5credibility was shot from the get go," because of a
misunderstanding I had from the court exchange court date.
Because of the court date on the court exchange said that I was
in jail.

So when I got the charges I was like -- I was in jail,

because I was in my head.
I don't believe that I was defended properly at all.
Like I -- just to clarify, I didn't take it to trial twice to
tell you that maybe I paid for it, because I didn't.
(inaudible) pay for it.

I

It was nothing like that, but Mr. Gravis

believed that what really happened wouldn't be conducive to my
well being and that they wouldn't -- it wouldn't be -- it just
wouldn't work.

He -- exactly what he said, it wouldn't work.

It

just wouldn't go, so -- and he said it was his choices to make
what he was going to do at trial.
So I don't -- no matter what, if you do agree with the
recommendations, please (inaudible) send me to prison.

I have

five kids, and they're growing up and I don't want to sit in jail
and stagnate in jail for (inaudible) something I've done
(inaudible).

I just don't want to be stagnant in jail.

I plan on appealing the matter because I feel that I've
been unfairly -- I haven't even been represented.

I mean right

out of the gate this guy says -- he stood up in court -- the
prosecuting attorney stood up in court and said, "How did you
even know about this court date?"
about court dates.

Like I wasn't supposed to know

I just don't know.
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-6If you agree with them, please -- I don't want the
recommendation.

I don't want to stay in jail for nine months

until -- while my family is growing.

I would rather be somewhere

where I could go to school or work or something instead of being
a burden on my husband and my kids.
THE COURT:

What's your current employment situation,

MS. KURR:

Right now we are -- we haven't had a home,

but we've been living with family for a year, and we have -- I'm
doing -- what is it called?
MR. GRAVIS:
MS. KURR:

I'm sorry.

Vocation -No.

It's a transitional housing program.

just got a house as of last week.
right now.

We're moving into it current

So they're just -- I'm doing (inaudible) programs

through voc-rehab, through (inaudible).
of it yet.

We

I don't understand all

Everything has been kind of really hectic right now.

We finally got a home after a year (inaudible).
I'd like to also ask you that no matter what the
sentence, my kids -- my husband works full time, and I do love my
kids.

We haven't taken -- registered them from the old school to

the new school, and I was wondering if you would give me time to
put them in there, to register them in (inaudible) school.
MR. GRAVIS:

Yeah, we were going to ask to let her check

into jail on Monday.
THE COURT:

All right.

According to the report, the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7
time that's been served in this case is 17 days; is that correct?
MR. GRAVIS:

Yes.

MS. KURR:

It was actually 30, but -- I was arrested

for (inaudible).
MR. SHAW:

Your Honor, I want to say one more thing, if

I may.
THE COURT:
MR. SHAW:

All right.
As I looked at the report, the record

reflects a total of I believe seven felonies whereas the matrix
only accounts for four and assigns two points -- or two and
assigns four points, rather.

So I mean this matrix has been

miscalculated to give her the benefit of the doubt.
MS. KURR:

You've got (inaudible).

You have to

(inaudible).
MR. SHAW:

All I'm trying to point out is what I'm

hearing here is there's not an acceptance of responsibility, it's
Mr. Gravis' fault.

This case was tried in front of a jury.

This

Court watched a video tape.. This jury rendered its verdict after
a very short period of time, and again, we have recurrent
behavior for years and years and years and years.

Ms. Kurr has

to stop.
THE COURT:

Is there anything further, Ms. Kurr, that

you wish to say or that anyone else wishes the Court to consider
before sentence is imposed?
MR. GRAVIS:

Just one thing, your Honor.

Although
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Mr. Shaw counts them right, there was a series of separate
forgeries, they're all the same conviction date.
MR. SHAW:

Yeah, but they're three --

MS. KURR:

That's all of them.

MR. SHAW:

-- different agencies.

MS. KURR:

Because I

MR. SHAW:

-- and Riverdale.

MS. KURR:

Because I did (inaudible) and I had my

There's North Ogden,

Ogden -—

(inaudible) consequences for that, and I went to jail for a year
and lost my kids and had to get them back and work my way up the
ladder, and do everything.,

I did it, and I did it awesome.

But

all of -- they spread them out and they don't put them all
together, but there is -- they was all the same time, and I
admitted to everything I did.

I took every hit on all of them,

because I did accept my (inaudible) consequences and my
responsibility for what I had done.
that also.

I have done (inaudible) from

My whole entire family has, as a matter of fact.

THE COURT:
MR. SHAW:
THE COURT:

All right.

Is there anything further?

No.
All right.

sentence in this case.

The Court is prepared to impose

For the defendant's conviction on the

charge of retail theft, a 3rd Degree Felony, the Court is going to
impose a sentence of incarceration in the Utah State Prison for
zero to five years.

It's an indeterminate length.

I am going to
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-9suspect that prison sentence, however, upon the successful
completion of court probation.
The court probation is going to be for a period of two
years.

The Court will require as the conditions of probation

that there be no violations of the law, federal, state, local or
otherwise, other than minor infractions during the period of
incarceration.
The Court is going to further require that the defendant
serve a period of 200 days in the Weber County Jail.
you credit for time served, which is the 17 days.

I will give

Also authorize

adjustments for good time, and further provide that the final 45
days of that sentence may be served through the day reporting
program.
Ma'am, do you have any employment at this point that's
available to you?
MS. KURR;

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

I will authorize work release as well, then,

subject to qualifying for the work release program as set forth
at the jail.

The probation period will continue following the

defendant's release from custody for a period of two years from
today's date.

That will be a zero tolerance court probation, so

that any further violations of the law will result in the
imposition of the sentence -- the prison sentence originally
imposed by the Court.
MR. GRAVIS:

That will be the sentence.
Can she check in Monday so she can --

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-101

THE COURT:

Yes.

She may check in on Monday.

That is

2

September 19th, 2011 at or before 5 p.m.

3

Monday will be the check in time.

4

matters, you do have a right of appeal from the sentence.

5

right continues for a period of 30 days.

6

MR. GRAVIS:
notice of appeal.

8

and we'll take care of that.

9

THE COURT:

11

Ma'am, as in all sentencing
That

She had previously filed a pro se motion

7

10

So before 5 p.m. on

I explained to her that we need to redo that

MR. GRAVIS:

All right.

Thank you.

That's all the matters I have at this time,

your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SHAW:

14

(Hearing concluded)

Thank you, Counsel.
Thank you, your Honor.
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